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Averting the Inherent Dangers of 
“Going Dark”: Why Congress Must 
Require a Locked Front Door to 
Encrypted Data 
Geoffrey S. Corn* 
 “I don’t want a back door . . . I want a front door. And I want 
the front door to have multiple locks. Big locks.” 
—Adm. Michael S. Rogers, Director of the NSA1 
I. Introduction 
Going dark. Few terms in contemporary national security and 
crime control parlance better exemplify the friction between 
individual liberty and collective security. Referring both to data “at 
rest” and “in motion,” the term is most often used to describe the 
effect of encryption technology embedded in commercially 
available cell phones and communications technologies that allow 
individuals to easily and effectively prevent access to their cell 
phone communications and digitally stored data.2 While 
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 1. See Ellen Nakashima & Barton Gellman, As Encryption Spreads, U.S. 
Grapples with Clash Between Privacy, Security, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/as-encryption-spreads-
us-worries-about-access-to-data-for-investigations/2015/04/10/7c1c7518-d401-11 
e4-a62f-ee745911a4ff_story.html?hpid=z1 (last visited June 20, 2015) (discussing 
the different interests in the debate over data privacy) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. See James B. Comey, Dir., FBI, Remarks at Brookings Institution (Oct. 
16, 2014) (explaining the challenge of maintaining national security because of 
emerging technologies), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-
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government officials have decried the problem of “going dark” for 
several years, their concerns were recently emphasized by Apple 
and Google’s decision to make encryption the default setting on 
their smartphones. And, unlike earlier encryption capability 
embedded in cell phones, this type of encryption is not susceptible 
to “front door” access through the use of encryption keys retained 
by the cell phone manufacturer and distributor.3 This unqualified 
encryption capability is increasingly viewed by democratic 
governments as a dangerous evolution of technology available to 
the general public.4 From a public security perspective, the 
confluence of pervasive use of cell devices to engage in 
communication with this encryption creates an unacceptable 
obstacle to lawful searches and surveillance that are necessary to 
protect the public from criminal and national security threats.5 
FBI Director James Comey’s comments about the problem of 
“going dark,” given at the Brookings Institute on October 16, 2014,6 
have reignited a debate that many believed was dead at the end of 
the “crypto-wars” of the 1990s. Since that time, encryption 
technologies have flourished within the United States and 
globally, in both the public and private sectors.7 Nobody, including 
                                                                                                     
dark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-safety-on-a-collision-course. 
 3. See Brian Naylor, Apple Says iOS Encryption Protects Privacy; FBI 
Raises Crime Fears, NPR (Oct. 8, 2014, 5:17 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/ 
alltechconsidered/2014/10/08/354598527/apple-says-ios-encryption-protects-privacy-
fbi-raises-crime-fears (last visited June 20, 2015) (discussing concerns about 
Apple’s policy on data encryption) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 4. See President Barack Obama & Prime Minister David Cameron, 
Remarks in Joint Press Conference, The White House, Office of the Press 
Secretary (Jan. 16, 2015) (discussing the potential dangers of data encryption), 
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/16/remarks-
president-obama-and-prime-minister-cameron-united-kingdom-joint-; Comey, 
supra note 2 (“[T]he FBI has a sworn duty to keep every American safe from crime 
and terrorism, and technology has become the tool of choice for some very 
dangerous people.”). 
 5. See Comey, supra note 2 (noting the ability to evade law enforcement as 
data encryption becomes more common). 
 6. See id. (explaining the potential dangers of spreading data encryption).  
 7. See Global Encryption Software Market 2019–Incidence of Data Breaches 
Drives Growth, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/global-encryption-software-market-2019---incidence-of-data-breaches-
drives-growth-296759501.html (last visited June 20, 2015) (explaining that 
recent data breaches have motivated organizations to encrypt data) (on file with 
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Director Comey, would challenge the value of encryption or the 
essential role it plays in digital security. Indeed, the government 
regularly encourages and promotes the adoption of strong and 
well-implemented encryption to protect sensitive data.8 Director 
Comey’s comments, however, highlighted the continued and 
evolving danger to the public posed by unlimited and irreversible 
encryption. The creation of a zone that is essentially immune from 
government access would undoubtedly promote privacy, but there 
is no question that it will also promote crime. In fact, as many 
recent studies have shown, it already has.9 Police face a real and 
significant threat that their ability to access evidence, even when 
armed with a warrant, will continue to decrease in coming years 
as encryption technologies become stronger and easier to 
implement. Without legal restrictions, the danger of “going dark” 
is palpable and must not be ignored.  
Civil libertarians see the issue from a completely different 
perspective. Their focus is not the risk to public security that the 
government emphasizes, but the risk of abusive government 
surveillance tactics that erode individual liberty.10 Citing what 
                                                                                                     
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 8. See Kara Swisher, Obama: The Re/Code Interview, RE/CODE (Feb. 15, 
2015), http://recode.net/2015/02/15/white-house-red-chair-obama-meets-swisher/ 
(last visited June 20, 2015) (“[T]here’s no scenario in which we don’t want really 
strong encryption.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Security 
Tip (ST04-019): Understanding Encryption, US-CERT, https://www.us-
cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-019 (last updated Feb. 6, 2013) (last visited June 20, 
2015) (explaining how data encryption works) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); see also, e.g., Smartphone Users Should Be Aware of Malware 
Targeting Mobile Devices and the Safety Measures to Help Avoid Compromise, 
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.fbi.gov/sandiego/press-
releases/2012/smartphone-users-should-be-aware-of-malware-targeting-mobile-
devices-and-the-safety-measures-to-help-avoid-compromise (last visited June 20, 
2015) (providing advice on how to protect your smartphone from hackers) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 9. See Comey, supra note 2 (explaining that the increased use of data 
encryption has resulted in increased crime); Andy Greenberg, Over 80 Percent of 
Dark-Web Visits Relate to Pedophilia, Study Finds, WIRED (Dec. 30, 2014), 
http://www.wired.com/2014/12/80-percent-dark-web-visits-relate-pedophilia-
study-finds/ (last visited June 20, 2015) (explaining that a great deal of 
anonymous internet traffic is directed at pedophilia-related websites) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 10. See Joshua Kopstein, The FBI Wants Apple to Make a Defective Phone, 
AL JAZEERA (Oct. 24, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/10/fbi-
surveillanceappleprivacyencryption.html (last visited June 20, 2015) (discussing 
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they believe is a consistent pattern of overzealous and 
unconstitutional government surveillance efforts directed against 
telephone and computer communications, they applaud the 
enhanced protection for individual privacy this technology has 
made the norm and not the exception.11  
In many ways, the “going dark” debate exemplifies a broader 
tension that has, since the inception of our nation, animated the 
line between public security and individual liberty. To facilitate 
progress in the debate, aides to President Obama are in the midst 
of preparing a report that will summarize the ways that the 
administration can bridge the gap between the government and 
privacy advocates.12 Finding the point of equilibrium between 
these two interests was the motivation for protection provided by 
the Fourth Amendment and the subsequent extension of these 
protections to the states through the conduit of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. But these protections are not, and have never been, 
understood as absolute. Achieving equilibrium between these 
competing interests also demands recognition that the text of the 
Fourth Amendment, along with the jurisprudence that has added 
established meaning to that text, establishes that restrictions on 
government surveillance are not and cannot be absolute.  
The proverbial fulcrum upon which this equilibrium must rest 
is the test of reasonableness, a concept characterized as the 
“touchstone” of the Fourth Amendment by the Supreme Court time 
and again. The notion of an absolute or unqualified barrier to 
government surveillance is fundamentally inconsistent with this 
standard of reasonableness, as it would enable activities that 
endanger the public, immune from lawful government detection. 
But encryption technology has evolved, and will likely continue to 
evolve, to enable the average user of personal communication 
devices to “go dark” with little or no effort.13 Does this technology 
                                                                                                     
the wishes of law enforcement agencies for companies to sell phones with less 
protected data) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 11. See id. (discussing increased efforts to keep data private). 
 12. See Elise Viebeck, White House Seeks to Break the Encryption Stalemate, 
THE HILL (Apr. 13, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/238602-white-
house-seeks-to-break-encryption-stalemate (last visited June 20, 2015) 
(discussing a forthcoming report that details possible approaches law 
enforcement can take to access private data if necessary for an investigation) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 13. See Comey, supra note 2 (discussing the prevalence of data encryption in 
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shift the fulcrum of the balance of interests at the core of the 
Fourth Amendment? Is there a net gain to society of adhering to 
the principles that underlie the Fourth Amendment such that the 
fulcrum should be reset to its traditional position? If so, should 
Congress prohibit the sale or dissemination of communications and 
storage technologies that render court-issued search warrants 
meaningless? Is there a way to accomplish this without creating 
an unacceptable level of risk to the privacy of “The People?” 
This Essay argues that the answer to this ultimate question is 
an emphatic yes; that to protect the interests of society, Congress 
should compel any manufacturer or distributor of communications 
and storage technologies that offer encryption as part of any 
product they sell or distribute in the United States to build in a 
mechanism allowing for lawful government surveillance and 
searches of the data stored or transmitted over those devices or 
services. Such access should not be through a “back door,” but 
instead through a well-documented and tested “front door” that 
ensures timely and efficient access to information when lawfully 
authorized. This Essay acknowledges the privacy interests 
implicated by this requirement; however it also proposes a novel 
protective measure to ensure that this requirement will not distort 
the balance of interests at the core of the Fourth Amendment: 
bifurcated control of encryption keys. Our proposal is that device 
manufacturers and communications system developers, whether 
domestic or foreign, should be encouraged to incorporate strong 
encryption technologies into their products, but they also should 
be prohibited from marketing devices or services in the United 
States that provide unqualified encryption that would prevent 
lawful access to users’ communications and data. Instead, 
legislation should require manufacturers and developers to create 
encryption keys that would be bifurcated and placed under the 
control of the manufacturer and some non-government entity 
devoted to privacy protection. Government access to the keys 
would therefore require lawful authorization that must satisfy 
both entities in control of the keys, either of which would be 
authorized, pursuant to statute, to challenge the legality of access.  
                                                                                                     
technological devices). 
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II. The Inherent Balance of Fourth Amendment Interests 
There are, of course, those who fear that a requirement to 
preserve even front door access to communications and stored data 
will also facilitate such access when it is not lawfully authorized or 
that lawful authorizations will nonetheless permit unjustified 
intrusions into individual privacy.14 Essentially, they assert that 
the government simply cannot be trusted with any ability to 
intrude on people’s privacy, whether authorized or not, and the 
encryption technologies that make it increasingly easy for 
individual users to “go dark” are a natural and appropriate 
response to unacceptable government overreach and intrusions of 
privacy. Others argue that the preservation of any “door,” whether 
front or back, creates vulnerabilities that cannot be tolerated in a 
free society.15  
Unfortunately, this endorsement of impenetrable encryption 
reflects a dangerous distortion of the balance between government 
surveillance authority and individual liberty central to the Fourth 
Amendment. Nowhere are the competing interests of collective 
societal security and individual liberty more apparent than in the 
text of that Amendment. There is no question that the Fourth 
Amendment restricted the government’s surveillance authority in 
the interests of protecting individual privacy and liberty. Nothing, 
however, in the text, history, or subsequent interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment supports the conclusion that it provides an 
absolute barrier to such surveillance. Instead, balance is the 
operative word: the Fourth Amendment also acknowledged that 
the people must be subjected to searches. So long as that search is 
                                                                                                     
 14. See Kopstein, supra note 10 (discussing mistrust of government 
intrusions). 
 15. See, e.g., Nakashima & Gellman, supra note 1 (“‘The basic question is, is 
it possible to design a completely secure system’ to hold a master key available to 
the U.S. government but not adversaries . . . . ‘There’s no way to do this where 
you don’t have unintentional vulnerabilities.’”); Carrie Johnson, Privacy 
Advocates Don’t Buy FBI’s Warning About Encryption Practices, NPR (Oct. 17, 
2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/10/17/356869566/privacy-advocates-don-t-buy-
fbi-s-warning-about-encryption-practices (last visited June 20, 2015) (“[I]f these 
companies are delivering end-to-end encrypted communications, the only logical 
way to provide law enforcement access is to escrow a key. And if the keys are 
there, whether they are in law enforcement hands, a third party or in the 
company’s hands, people will try and steal them.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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reasonable within the meaning of the Amendment, it is lawful and 
permissible. In short, the people have never had an absolute and 
unqualified right to privacy but instead a right to be secure against 
unreasonable government intrusions into those places and things 
protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court has consistently emphasized the 
importance of this balance and that, when assessing the 
reasonableness of government surveillance, it is necessary to 
acknowledge the government’s interest in effective law 
enforcement.16 One need not dig deep to identify this vein of 
analysis in many seminal Fourth Amendment decisions. For 
example, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,17 the Court addressed the 
validity of consent obtained without providing notice of a right to 
refuse the officer’s request.18 The Court endorsed a totality of the 
circumstances test for assessing the validity of consent and 
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that notice of the right to decline 
consent is a necessary requirement.19 In the opinion, the Court 
emphasized the importance of consent, not in abstract terms, but 
in direct connection with the function of law enforcement—solving 
crimes:  
[I]n situations where the police have some evidence of illicit 
activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search 
authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of 
obtaining important and reliable evidence . . . a search 
pursuant to consent may result in considerably less 
inconvenience for the subject of the search, and, properly 
conducted, is a constitutionally permissible and wholly 
legitimate aspect of effective police activity.20 
Later in the opinion, the Court again emphasized the link 
between consent and the function of law enforcement, noting that, 
“the community has a real interest in encouraging consent, for the 
                                                                                                     
 16. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (discussing the 
need for police questioning); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979) (noting 
that the expectation of privacy must be weighed against the government action). 
 17. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).  
 18. See id. at 223 (discussing voluntariness in responding to questions by 
law enforcement). 
 19. See id. at 225–30 (noting that officers are not required to inform 
individuals of the right to decline consent).  
 20. Id. at 227–28. 
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resulting search may yield necessary evidence for the solution and 
prosecution of crime . . . .”21 
Of course, issues related to encryption of communications and 
stored data do not implicate consent. However, like consent, they 
clearly implicate the balance between the need to enable effective 
government surveillance and individual privacy. And there is 
perhaps an even more important link to Bustamonte: overly 
restrictive standards that frustrate legitimate law enforcement 
surveillance efforts conflict with the Fourth Amendment’s core 
objective. Indeed, this was the primary basis for the Court’s 
rejection of the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that notice of a right to 
decline consent was a dispositive requirement for validity. As the 
Court noted,  
The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent 
searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect 
of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible 
touchstone. To approve such searches without the most careful 
scrutiny would sanction the possibility of official coercion; to 
place artificial restrictions upon such searches would jeopardize 
their basic validity. Just as was true with confessions, the 
requirement of a “voluntary” consent reflects a fair 
accommodation of the constitutional requirements involved.22 
Allowing device manufacturers and communications service 
providers to embed technologies in their products that make it 
impossible for the government to gain access to an individual’s 
data is the surveillance analogue to the “artificial restriction” on 
lawful government activity that the Court condemned in 
Bustamonte.23 In fact, such encryption is even more incompatible 
with the Fourth Amendment’s inherent balance because unlimited 
use of encryption technology is not intended to impose a 
“restriction” on lawful surveillance—it is intended to impose a 
complete prohibition. 
Concededly, prohibiting this type of encryption will force 
individuals to assume some increased risk of unauthorized access. 
Indeed, this seems to be the principal argument in support of both 
                                                                                                     
 21. Id. at 243. 
 22. Id. at 229. 
 23. See id. (discussing the dangers of placing unnecessary restrictions on 
police searches). 
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the necessity and legitimacy of such encryption.24 But the risk that 
the government will abuse its authority and engage in unlawful 
surveillance cannot justify a complete barrier to lawful 
surveillance. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment itself tolerates such 
risk by allowing for lawful government searches and surveillance 
in the first place.  
Accordingly, addressing the validity of “going dark” encryption 
should not focus on whether prohibiting such encryption creates a 
risk of unlawful government access to information but instead 
whether the risk it creates is necessary to preserve the inherent 
balance of Fourth Amendment interests. Moreover, the weight of 
the risk must be evaluated on the basis of how much it can be 
mitigated through technological and legislative solutions, allowing 
for a meaningful cost-risk analysis. Indeed, this more precise risk 
assessment was endorsed by none other than Justice Marshall in 
his dissenting opinion in Smith v. Maryland,25 ironically the 
decision that provides the foundation for almost all arguments in 
support of government collection of communications metadata. In 
Smith, the Court held that there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the numbers dialed from a private telephone in an 
individual’s home because the numbers are divulged to the third 
party phone company.26 Accordingly, government access to those 
numbers in no way implicated the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment.27  
Justice Marshall rejected this conclusion. In his view, the 
“exposed to a third party” touchstone for assessing the 
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy, and the accordant 
applicability of the Fourth Amendment, was invalid.28 Instead, 
Justice Marshall believed that the nature of functioning in a free 
society necessitated its citizens to divulge certain information—in 
                                                                                                     
 24. See Kopstein, supra note 10 (discussing the benefits of data encryption). 
 25. See Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. 735, 735 (1979) (weighing the risk of 
government interference). 
 26. See id. at 745–46 (explaining that privacy expectations should be lower 
because the information has already been given to a third party). 
 27. See id. (discussing the fact that government access to that information 
does not unreasonably interfere with privacy expectations).  
 28. See id. at 748–50 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing against the third-
party doctrine in the majority opinion).  
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this case phone numbers.29 Thus, Justice Marshall rejected the 
conclusion that an individual forfeited an expectation of privacy in 
information simply by disclosing it to a third party.30 Rather, he 
argued, the real test was not “whether privacy expectations are 
legitimate [based] on the risks an individual can be presumed to 
accept when imparting information to third parties, but on the 
risks he should be forced to assume in a free and open society.”31  
Justice Marshall’s view of the “Third Party Doctrine” seems to 
be gaining new momentum as courts struggle to apply the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirements to increasingly ubiquitous 
digital storage devices. Judges across the United States, from 
magistrates to the Supreme Court, are becoming increasingly 
persuaded that somehow the dynamics have shifted as a result of 
these “super-storage” containers. This struggle was reflected in the 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in United States v. Jones32 and 
Riley v. California.33 Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence reflected 
this struggle—arguing that what society is willing to accept as a 
reasonable expectation of privacy should turn not so much on the 
information an individual exposes to the public but instead on 
whether the collection of that information is so extensive as to 
“alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way 
that is inimical to democratic society.”34 Thus, Justice Sotomayor 
seeks to revive Justice Marshall’s view when arguing that “it may 
be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily 
disclosed to third parties.”35 
                                                                                                     
 29. See id. (noting that calling a phone number should not kill any 
expectation of privacy).  
 30. See id. (disagreeing with the third-party doctrine that the Court 
adopted).  
 31. Id. at 750.  
 32. 132 S. Ct. 945, 946 (2012) (introducing the difficulty in applying existing 
doctrine to emerging technologies). 
 33. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (discussing the reasonableness of searching 
information stored in a cell phone without a warrant). 
 34. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (citing United States v. Cuevas–Perez, 640 F.3d 
272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011)). 
 35. Id. at 957 (“I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed 
to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, 
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.” (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Privacy is not a discrete commodity, 
possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or 
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This theme continues in Riley, where the Supreme Court 
considered whether the police could search a cellular telephone 
incident to arrest.36 The Court’s opinion in Riley, which overturned 
well-established precedents, hinged entirely on the fact that such 
a great deal of data could be stored in a modern smartphone.37 
Thus, Chief Justice Roberts concluded, such devices are simply 
quantitatively and “qualitatively different.”38 
Ironically, Justice Marshall’s more restrictive standard for 
assessing applicability of Fourth Amendment protections provides 
a compelling justification for restricting “going dark” encryption. 
Prohibiting such unlimited encryption would, to some extent, 
increase the risk of unlawful government access (although, as 
explained below, probably not nearly as much as many privacy 
advocates would have the public believe). But this risk is inherent 
                                                                                                     
phone company for a limited business purpose need not assume that this 
information will be released to other persons for other purposes.”))). 
 36. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480 (questioning the constitutionality of 
warrantless cell phone searches). 
 37. See id. at 2489 (considering the storage capability of current technology). 
 38. Id. at 2490. Some courts and scholars pushed this argument further, 
asserting that even searches conducted pursuant to warrants should be strictly 
constrained in their scope when applied to digital devices due to the enormous 
amounts of data those devices can store. See, e.g., United States v. Comprehensive 
Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2009), opinion revised and 
superseded, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing the need to protect privacy 
interests); see also In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d 159, 160 (D.D.C. 
2014) (denying a search warrant to search an iPhone); In re Search of Black 
iPhone, 27 F. Supp. 3d 74, 78 (D.D.C. 2014) (discussing the risk of the government 
gaining access to too much private information); In re Search of Odys Loox Plus 
Tablet, 28 F. Supp. 3d 40, 44–46 (D.D.C. 2014) (discussing issues that arise from 
a search warrant request’s lack of clarity in how law enforcement will search the 
cell phone); In re The Search of premises known as: a Nextel Cellular Telephone, 
No. 14–MJ–8005–DJW, 2014 WL 2898262, at *3–7 (D. Kan. June 26, 2014) 
(denying a search warrant because the application failed to meet the particularity 
requirement). Those arguing that digital searches are so different as to require 
entirely new protocols to control searches seem to believe that the Framers of the 
Constitution could never have imagined allowing searches of containers that 
could hold so much personal information. Yet that is exactly what the Framers 
contemplated when they made abundantly clear that the government should have 
the authority to search homes—the most sacrosanct of all protected areas. One 
could argue that the “quantitative and qualitative” differences of modern 
electronic devices is that they compile much more information than would ever 
have occurred in the eighteenth century. While this is true, we should also recall 
that polymaths like George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison 
were notoriously meticulous in documenting and storing their thoughts, 
communications, and even business records in their homes.  
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in all government search and surveillance capabilities and is 
tolerated by the Fourth Amendment. More importantly, this is a 
risk that members of a free society must accept as a necessary cost 
to protecting the broader societal interest in facilitating lawful 
access to evidence. In contrast, preventing access altogether would 
not only protect individuals from unreasonable searches, but also 
would protect them from any search, thereby frustrating the 
legitimate governmental and societal interest in discovering crime 
and protecting national security. And this interest is far from 
speculative. 
Allowing the continued development and use of “going dark” 
encryption will ultimately distort the balance at the core of the 
Fourth Amendment. Preserving that balance necessitates a 
fundamentally different approach: the preservation of “front door” 
access with a carefully constructed mechanism to guard that front 
door against unlawful entry. Such a balanced approach is both 
necessary and feasible. 
III. Front Door Access and the “Split Key” Mechanism 
Many critics of both “going dark” and efforts to restrict such 
encryption address the issue through extremes. On one end of the 
spectrum, advocates for privacy rights emphasize the risk that 
government collusion with cell device manufacturers will make 
access to encryption keys too easy, leading to inevitable abuse.39 
On the other end of the spectrum, advocates for public and national 
security emphasize the dangers of keyless encryption and how that 
danger necessitates government access to manufacturer 
encryption keys.40 
                                                                                                     
 39. See Mike Masnick, Everybody Knows FBI Director James Comey Is 
Wrong About Encryption, Even the FBI, TECHDIRT (Oct. 20, 2014, 10:22 AM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141019/07115528878/everybody-knows-fbi-
director-james-comey-is-wrong-about-encryption-even-fbi.shtml (last visited 
June 20, 2015) (discussing the current state of data encryption) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 40. See Eric Chabrow, Obama Sees Need for Encryption Backdoor, BANK 
INFO SECURITY (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/cameron-
obama-a-7809/op-1 (last visited June 20, 2015) (explaining a few of the different 
approaches to allowing government access of encrypted information) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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There is, however, a solution to this problem that, like the 
Fourth Amendment itself, strikes a credible balance between these 
two extremes: a “split key” approach. Under this approach, to 
protect the government’s interest in lawful access to encrypted 
data, manufacturers would be required, by statute, to preserve 
encryption keys for the devices and services they produce and 
distribute in the United States. To mitigate the risk of unlawful 
government access as the result of collusion with manufacturers or 
the abuse of the manufacturers themselves, these keys would be 
“split” and retained by two (or more) distinct entities: the 
manufacturer and a privacy rights organization. 
The advantages of this “split key” approach are obvious. 
Unlike “going dark” encryption, the government’s interest in 
efficient lawful access to encrypted data would be preserved. By 
splitting control of the encryption key between two entities—one 
of which would neither be susceptible to government pressure nor 
profit motives, but instead devoted to protecting the privacy 
interests of the public—the risk of unlawful government access 
would be substantially reduced.  
Such an approach is obviously contrary to the objectives of 
some privacy advocates, most notably those who have launched a 
series of retorts intent on snuffing out the development of 
mechanisms to preserve efficient lawful access to cell data.41 The 
polemic aims to discredit the very concept of allowing any 
government access whatsoever to encrypted data and 
communications, suggesting that such access can only be achieved 
by building defects into the encryption.42 These opponents frame 
efforts to preserve such access as a call for the creation of “back 
doors” that can be exploited by the United States and any other 
government.43 They argue that the creation of back doors will 
introduce unacceptable vulnerabilities in products and systems44 
                                                                                                     
 41. See With Liberty to Monitor All, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 28, 2014), 
http://www.hrw.org/node/127362/section/2 (last visited June 20, 2015) (providing 
a summary of a 120-page report that “documents how government surveillance 
and secrecy are undermining press freedom, the public’s right to information, and 
the right to counsel, all human rights essential to a healthy democracy”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 42. See id. (opposing any changes that would make data less secure). 
 43. See id. (same). 
 44. Some have argued that the creation of additional encryption keys will be 
an attractive target for hackers no matter where they are stored. While that is 
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and point to examples where, in the past, such vulnerabilities have 
been exploited by hackers.45  
To be clear, this “split key” proposal is not a subterfuge method 
of creating “back door” access to data. It, like Director Comey, 
seeks to achieve preservation of “front door” access to encrypted 
communications. This might seem like a minor distinction, but it 
is not, as those who have misrepresented Comey’s comments 
understand perfectly. Unlike a “back door,” which generally refers 
to an undisclosed vulnerability in an application or device, a front 
door is a well-documented and clear mechanism for both 
encrypting and decrypting data, whether it be data in motion 
(communications) or at rest (stored data). To be secure, encryption 
should be subject to rigorous testing. Thus, its presence should be 
open to the public and available for attack, both in laboratories and 
in the real world. This is the only way to truly evaluate the 
trustworthiness of encryption, with vulnerabilities being corrected 
as they are discovered, to constantly strengthen the protocol and 
its implementation. Essentially, a front door is the digital 
                                                                                                     
true, it must be acknowledged that hackers, like all logical actors, recognize that 
a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Thus, hackers generally seek the 
path of least resistance to achieve their goals. It would generally be much easier 
for a hacker to compromise a user’s device through a Trojan horse or to obtain 
their credentials through social engineering than it would be to hack into two or 
more well protected systems. Moreover, despite modern society’s obsession with 
connectivity, nothing requires a database maintaining encryption keys to be 
connected to the Internet. Thus, such a database could be immensely more secure 
than encryption keys or passwords found on users’ devices.   
 45. See Johnson, supra note 15 (noting that fears about data insecurity are 
valid “since foreign governments have already found a way to hack into major 
American tech companies”); The Lawfare Podcast, Episode #98: Chris Soghoian 
Responds to FBI Director James Comey LAWFARE BLOG (Nov. 1, 2014), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-episode-98-chris-soghoian-responds-fbi-
director-james-comey (last visited June 20, 2015) (discussing potential problems 
with weak data security) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The 
Athens Affair, cited by Soghoian in this podcast, is probably the most frequently 
referenced example of the danger of creating “back doors” in communications 
networks. It is, however, a poor example that speaks more to the need for solid 
network security than it does to the creation of back doors. For an explanation of 
how Vodafone’s failure to purchase and install Ericsson’s Intercept Management 
System allowed this hack to occur, see Vassilis Prevelakis & Diomidis Spinellis, 
The Athens Affair: How Some Extremely Smart Hackers Pulled Off the Most 
Audacious Cell-Network Break-in Ever, IEEE SPECTRUM (June 29, 2007), 
http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-athens-affair (last visited June 20, 
2015) (discussing a major hack of cell phone data in Greece) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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equivalent of a big, ingeniously engineered lock on the only 
entrance to an otherwise secure building. It is a lock that has been 
tested by every available lock picker and found to be secure, with 
any identified weaknesses being constantly fixed. Such a lock is 
always superior to a secret entrance in the rear of a building.  
When presented with the option of using the front door versus 
the back door, law enforcement will always choose the former, and 
nobody is suggesting that there should be any imperfections built 
into the front door lock. The only question is: Who should have 
access to the key, and under what circumstances? One could 
imagine leaving the key to such a lock in the hands of the 
manufacturer, the police, or even locked inside another container 
with a similar lock. All of these scenarios carry different, but 
manageable, risks. They are also available just as much in the 
digital world as the real world—in fact more so, as encryption 
likely is stronger than the most ingenious physical lock ever 
created.  
There is no reason, as is often assumed, that the key to the 
lock must be placed solely in the hands of the government or the 
manufacturer, both of which could be motivated by perverse 
incentives and thereby present risks, as Justice Marshall might 
argue, that are unacceptable for members of a free society. The 
split key model mitigates this risk and allows for the preservation 
of secure, timely, and efficient front door access to evidence when 
lawfully authorized; splitting the key to provide that access will 
align the inherent risk of improper access with what should be 
demanded of a free society.  
IV. Splitting the Key 
The use of split key encryption to lock access to data 
significantly mitigates the concern that a duplicate or escrow key 
will be abused.  An encryption key itself can not only be split into 
discrete parts and stored separately; it can be encapsulated within 
other “containers” of encrypted data.46 Each container can be 
placed in the possession of another entity, requiring cooperation by 
two or more entities to unlock the series of keys to decrypt the 
                                                                                                     
 46. See supra Part III (introducing the split key approach and its 
advantages). 
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cipher text into plain text47. Thus, for example, the manufacturer 
of a device could hold one portion of the key, or a key to an 
encapsulated container.48 A privacy group could hold another 
key.49 Only by combining all parts of the key could the cipher text 
be returned to plain text.50 If and when the government sought the 
use of the encryption key, it would bear the burden to satisfy both 
custodians that access is authorized by law, in most cases as the 
result of a lawful order. Each custodian would then be in a position 
to assess the legal basis and contest the order if it believed the 
access to be improper. Thus, only when both custodians validated 
the legal basis for access, each of which approaching the question 
with differing interests, would decryption occur.51 This split key 
option preserves privacy, security, and the government’s ability to 
obtain evidence when authorized.  
Implementing this split key approach would necessitate a 
statutory mandate to create, split, and retain encryption keys. 
Imposition of such a mandate is well within the authority of the 
federal government as an exercise of its regulation of interstate 
commerce and communications.52 A closely related example of such 
a mandate can be found in the Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act (CALEA).53 While this statute does not require 
decryption, it does reflect the logical balance between privacy and 
public security by imposing an obligation on telecommunication 
providers to build into their systems lawful intercept capabilities. 
According to a Congressional Research Service report on CALEA: 
                                                                                                     
 47. See supra Part III (explaining what split key encryption may look like). 
 48. See supra Part III (articulating an approach that affords manufacturers 
autonomy while ensuring their accountability). 
 49. If Congress so desired, it could place additional keys, or portions of keys, 
in the hands of other entities—for example, the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts or an ombudsman. 
 50. See supra Part III (explaining how the split key model allows for secure, 
timely, and efficient access to encrypted data). 
 51. See supra Part III (arguing that splitting control of the encryption key 
between two or more entities with diverging interests would substantially reduce 
the risk of unlawful government access to encrypted data). 
 52. See infra notes 58–61 and accompanying text (analogizing to the 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act as a basis for authority to 
mandate a split key approach to data encryption). 
 53. 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2012). 
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CALEA is intended to preserve the ability of law enforcement 
officials to conduct electronic surveillance effectively and 
efficiently, despite the deployment of new digital technologies 
and wireless services by the telecommunications industry. 
CALEA requires telecommunications carriers to modify their 
equipment, facilities, and services to ensure that they are able 
to comply with authorized electronic surveillance.54 
The same report also emphasizes that CALEA was never 
intended to expand law enforcement surveillance authority, but 
instead: 
[O]nly to ensure that after law enforcement obtains the 
appropriate legal authority, carriers will have the necessary 
capabilities and sufficient capacity to assist law enforcement in 
conducting digital electronic surveillance regardless of the 
specific telecommunications systems or services deployed.55 
For this purpose, the statute requires telecommunication 
providers to be able to respond expeditiously to government 
surveillance orders, including the requirement to “consult with 
telecommunications equipment manufacturers to develop 
equipment necessary to comply with the capability and capacity 
requirements identified by the FBI.”56 
But CALEA also offers the type of safeguards a split-key 
decryption requirement would incorporate. First, it requires 
telecommunications carriers “to ensure that any interception of 
communications or access to call-identifying information that is 
conducted within their premises can only be done with a court 
order.”57 Second, it provides for a certain degree of execution 
oversight, in that it also requires the affirmative intervention of an 
individual officer or employee of the carrier acting in accordance 
with regulations prescribed by the Federal Communications 
Commission.58 
CALEA is a useful model for the split-key decryption statute 
that would facilitate lawful access to communications and stored 
                                                                                                     
 54. PATRICIA MOLONEY FIGLIOLA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30677, DIGITAL 
SURVEILLANCE: THE COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT 2 
(2007), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL30 677.pdf.  
 55. Id. at 3. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  
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data.59 Like CALEA, the split-key option reflects a compromise 
between public security and individual privacy, ensuring lawful 
access to data while mitigating the risk of unlawful access or 
investigatory overreach.60 And, like CALEA, it reflects the reality 
that the risk of improper access resulting from the requirement is 
within the range of risk necessary to further the legitimate public 
safety and national security interests related to surveillance.61 A 
clear and simple mandate to develop and maintain split encryption 
keys and to include a provision that provides standing to the 
custodians of the split encryption keys to enable them to challenge 
the legality of any access request will produce an analogous 
balance in the realm of encrypted data. 
V. Responding to the Inevitable Criticisms 
Like CALEA, a statutory obligation along the lines proposed 
herein will inevitably trigger criticisms and generate concerns.62 
One obvious criticism is that the creation of an escrow key or the 
maintenance of a duplicate key by a manufacturer would introduce 
an unacceptable risk of compromise for the device.63 This argument 
presupposes that the risk is significant, that the costs of its 
exploitation are large, and that the benefit is not worth the risk. 
Yet manufacturers, product developers, service providers, and 
users constantly introduce such risks. Nearly every feature or bit 
of code added to a device introduces a risk, some greater than 
others. The vulnerabilities that have been introduced to computers 
by software such as Flash, ActiveX controls, Java, and web 
                                                                                                     
 59. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text (explaining that CALEA 
provides a closely related example for such a mandate). 
 60. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text (noting the balance struck 
between privacy and public security by CALEA). 
 61. See supra Part III (noting that the split key approach better aligns the 
inherent risk of improper access with the necessity of protecting the broader 
societal interest in facilitating lawful access to evidence). 
 62. See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text (noting that criticisms 
stem from concern over unlawful facilitation of access to communication and the 
potential for unjustified intrusions into individual privacy even when 
communications are lawfully accessed). 
 63. See supra notes 15, 39–40 and accompanying text (noting that opponents 
frame efforts to preserve such access as a call for the creation of easily exploitable 
“back doors”). 
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browsers are well documented.64 The ubiquitous SQL database, 
while extremely effective at helping web designers create effective 
data driven websites, is notorious for its vulnerability to SQL 
injection attacks.65 Adding microphones to electronic devices 
opened the door to aural interceptions.66 Similarly, the 
introduction of cameras has resulted in unauthorized video 
surveillance of users.67 Consumers accept all of these risks, 
however, because we, as individual users and as a society, have 
concluded that they are worth the cost.   
Some will inevitably argue that no new possible 
vulnerabilities should be introduced into devices to allow the 
government to execute reasonable, and therefore lawful, searches 
for unique and otherwise unavailable evidence. However, this 
argument implicitly asserts that such a feature is either of no value 
or merely insignificant value to society. Herein lies the Achilles’ 
heel to opponents of mandated front-door access: the conclusion is 
entirely at odds with the inherent balance between individual 
liberty and collective security central to the Fourth Amendment 
itself.68 Nor should lawmakers be deluded into believing that the 
                                                                                                     
 64. See, e.g., Ed Bott, Microsoft to Block Outdated Java Versions in Internet 
Explorer, ZDNET.COM (Aug. 6, 2014, 11:54 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/ 
microsoft-to-block-outdated-java-versions-in-internet-explorer/ (last visited June 
18, 2015) (noting that such software, while easily accessible and useful, can be 
easily used against users in potentially dangerous ways) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 65. See Gery Menegaz, SQL Injection Attack: What It Is and How to Prevent 
It, ZDNET.COM (July 13, 2012, 12:13 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/sql-
injection-attack-what-is-it-and-how-to-prevent-it/ (last visited June 18, 2015) 
(explaining why SQL Injection attacks are so common) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 66. See Laurent Simon & Ross Anderson, PIN Skimmer: Inferring PINs 
Through the Camera and Microphone, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD ACM 
WORKSHOP ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN SMARTPHONES & MOBILE DEVICES 67 
(Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/pinskimmer_spsm13.pdf 
(discussing how phone cameras, microphones, and other sensors can be used as 
powerful, cheap, and convenient spying tools). 
 67. See Rebecca Abrahams & Stephen Bryen, Your Computer and Phone 
Cameras Are On—Beware!, HUFFINGTON POST (July 27, 2014, 5:59 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebecca-abrahams/your-computer--phone-came_ 
b_5398896.html (last visited June 18, 2015) (noting that spying through 
smartphone cameras, computer webcams, laptops, and tablets is widespread 
practice by various governments) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 68. See supra Part II (maintaining that allowing for unqualified absolute 
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currently existing vulnerabilities that we live with on a daily basis 
are less significant in scope than the possibility of obtaining 
complete access to the encrypted contents of a device. Various 
malware variants that are so widespread as to be almost 
omnipresent in our online community achieve just such access 
through what would seem like minor cracks in the defense of 
systems.69  
One example is the Zeus malware strain, which has been tied 
to the unlawful online theft of hundreds of millions of dollars from 
United States companies and citizens and gives its operator 
complete access to and control over any computer it infects.70 It can 
be installed on a machine through the simple mistake of viewing 
an infected website or email, or clicking on an otherwise innocuous 
link.71 The malware is designed to not only bypass malware 
detection software, but also to deactivate the software’s ability to 
detect it.72 Zeus and the many other variants of malware that are 
freely available to purchasers on dark-net websites and forums are 
responsible for the theft of funds from countless online bank 
accounts (the credentials having been stolen by the malware’s key-
logger features), the theft of credit card information, and 
innumerable personal identifiers.73 
                                                                                                     
encryption will ultimately distort the balance at the core of the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 69. See Malware Creation Increasing, Trojans Most Popular Attack, TREND 
MICRO (Nov. 28, 2014), http://blog.trendmicro.com/malware-creation-increasing-
trojans-popular-attack/ (last visited June 18, 2015) (noting that malware creation 
“has been growing at an unprecedented rate” and the global infection ratio has 
been increasing) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 70. See GameOver Zeus Botnet Disrupted, FBI (June 2, 2014), 
http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/june/gameover-zeus-botnet-disrupted (last 
visited June 18, 2015) (announcing that the collaborative effort among 
international partners to disrupt GameOver Zeus and Cryptolocker have proven 
successful, and that “significant progress has been made in remediating 
computers infected with the GameOver Zeus”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 71. See id. (noting that the infection was predominantly spread through 
spam e-mail or phishing messages). 
 72.  See id. (noting that the malware was able to download and install 
additional malware, which was then used to extract banking credentials and 
facilitate the illegal withdrawal of funds from individuals and businesses). 
 73. See id. (“In the case of GameOver Zeus, its primary purpose is to capture 
banking credentials from infected computers, then use those credentials to 
initiate or re-direct wire transfers to accounts overseas that are controlled by the 
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Critics of requiring preservation of “front-door access” will 
likely also argue that society will be better served by pursuing the 
unrestrained development of encryption technology. These two 
approaches are not, however, incompatible. However, it is both 
naïve and dangerous to fail to recognize—and account for—the 
reality that some of these advances bring with them risks that 
must be managed at a societal level. Ultimately, individual choices 
or actions will not be sufficient to diminish or minimize such risks. 
Some suggest that any restriction on the evolution of encryption 
technology is the digital equivalent to prohibiting development of 
the automobile. This type of hyperbole distorts the issue. If there 
is an analogue, it is more appropriately characterized as simply 
requiring the development of safety mechanisms as the automobile 
evolves. Industry is today capable of this type of more cautious and 
responsible development of encryption technology. Few could 
reasonably argue that it would have been more efficient to design 
the automobile with safety features at the outset, rather than 
trying to cobble together solutions to the dangers they impose at a 
later date. This is the opportunity available in relation to 
encryption.  
Is there precedent for using a split key approach to encryption? 
Absolutely. It may surprise some to learn that the security of the 
entire Internet domain system is, essentially, being protected by a 
split key approach.74  
Why, however, should the government interfere with the free-
market evolution of encryption technology, imposing a 
requirement to incorporate and preserve “front door access” to 
data? The answer is twofold. First, the market is producing an 
                                                                                                     
criminals. Losses attributable to GameOver Zeus are estimated to be more than 
$100 million.”). 
 74. See Adam Hadhazy, Internet ‘Key Holders’ Are Insurance Against Cyber 
Attack, LIVESCIENCE (July 29, 2010, 5:48 AM), http://www.livescience.com/6791-
internet-key-holders-insurance-cyber-attack.html (last visited June 18, 2015) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)  
At least five key-holding members of this fellowship would have to 
meet at a secure data center in the United States to reboot this so-
called Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) in case of 
a very unlikely system collapse.  ‘If you round up five of these guys, 
they can decrypt [the root key] should the West Coast fall in the water 
and the East Coast get hit by a nuclear bomb,’ Richard Lamb, program 
manager for DNSSEC at ICANN, told TechNewsDaily.  
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outcome in conflict with the Fourth Amendment’s central and 
essential balance of interests.75 Second, the market-driven 
evolution of encryption technology distorts this balance because 
the costs of the dangers imposed by the technology are externalized 
to society, rather than internalized by the manufacturer or 
individual users.76 When the costs of market-driven 
development—in this case, frustration of lawful government 
surveillance efforts—are so widespread among society, the market 
impact is diluted and cannot produce a rational influence. It is 
precisely in such situations that governmental action is required 
to avoid the common pool problem—the “race to the bottom” as 
described in the law and economics theory. 
Arguably, the market would drive manufacturers to include 
such “front door access” features if doing so was perceived by the 
consumer to be in her best interest.77 But because the vast majority 
of users will be more interested in the security of their data than 
in the ability of the government to gain access to that data in the 
course of lawful surveillance activities, the societal interest is 
poorly aligned with market forces.78 Only when individuals are 
directly affected by the inability of the government to access such 
information will they have any motivation to complain. This may 
result in the occasional article or outcry by the victim of a crime, 
but it is unlikely to shift the balance of public opinion, or more 
importantly, to make such an impact on the sales of a given 
product as to alter market oriented encryption development. This 
is true despite the fact that the cost to the victim will likely be 
                                                                                                     
 75. See supra Part II (noting that an absolute barrier to government 
surveillance is fundamentally inconsistent with the reasonableness standard of 
the Fourth Amendment). 
 76. See supra Part II (noting that preventing access altogether would 
frustrate the legitimate governmental interest in discovering crime and 
protecting national security). 
 77. See supra Part IV (noting that such drivers would reflect a logical 
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systems). 
 78. See Kevin Poulson, Apple’s iPhone Encryption Technology Is a Godsend, 
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(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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exponentially greater than the benefits to users of the device 
lacking the feature. Thus, legislation or government regulation is 
appropriate to ensure that such features are included.  
None of these considerations will persuade everyone that 
mandated front door access is a necessary measure to preserve a 
credible and effective balance between individual liberty and 
public security.79 There will always be critics who fear that no 
matter how carefully the law controls access to an encryption key 
to the front door, it will be abused and result in unauthorized 
access.80 Others are concerned that even authorized use of the key, 
while lawful, will nonetheless permit unjustified intrusions into 
individual privacy.81 These fears, however, are inherent in any 
government search and surveillance capability and have been 
historically managed effectively. Thus, the first of these fears is 
fairly easily managed. As for the second, it is the People—
represented by Congress and the state legislatures and limited by 
the Constitution—that decide when privacy rights trump the 
government’s need to obtain evidence. As described above, in 
United States jurisprudence, this balance has consistently 
weighed in favor of government access to evidence; nothing about 
encryption should change this conclusion.  
VI. Conclusion 
The risks related to “going dark” are real. When the President 
of the United States,82 the Prime Minister of the United 
                                                                                                     
 79. See supra Part II (conceding that there are those who fear that a 
requirement to preserve even front door access to communications and stored 
data will also facilitate such access when it is not lawfully authorized). 
 80. See supra Part II (noting that these same skeptics will attack even lawful 
authorizations for access to encrypted data as nonetheless permitting unjustified 
intrusions into individual privacy). 
 81. See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text (noting that such critics 
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people’s privacy, whether authorized or not). 
 82. Nakashima & Gellman, supra note 1. 
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Kingdom,83 and the Director of the FBI84 all publicly express deep 
concerns about how this phenomenon will endanger their 
respective nations, it is difficult to ignore. Today, encryption 
technologies that are making it increasingly easy for individual 
users to prevent even lawful government access to potentially vital 
information related to crimes or other national security threats. 
This evolution of individual encryption capabilities represents a 
fundamental distortion of the balance between government 
surveillance authority and individual liberty central to the Fourth 
Amendment. And balance is the operative word. The right of the 
people to be secure against unreasonable government intrusions 
into those places and things protected by the Fourth Amendment 
must be vehemently protected. Reasonable searches, however, 
should not only be permitted, but they should be mandated where 
necessary. 
Congress has the authority to ensure that such searches are 
possible. While some argue that this could cause American 
manufacturers to suffer, saddled as they will appear to be by the 
“Snowden Effect,” the rules will apply equally to any manufacturer 
that wishes to do business in the United States. Considering that 
the United States economy is the largest in the world, it is highly 
unlikely that foreign manufacturers will forego access to its 
market to avoid having to create CALEA-like solutions to allow for 
lawful access to encrypted data. Just as foreign cellular telephone 
providers, such as T-Mobile, are active in the United States, so too 
will foreign device manufacturers and other communications 
services adjust their technology to comply with our laws and 
regulations. This will put American and foreign companies on an 
equal playing field while encouraging ingenuity and competition. 
Most importantly, “the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects” will be protected not only 
“against unreasonable searches and seizures,”85 but also against 
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attacks by criminals and terrorists. And is this not, in essence, the 
primary purpose of government? 
